

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/9/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10365-10006
RECORD SERIES : HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 65-68530-99

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : CIA
TO : HQ
TITLE :

DATE : 03/26/1964
PAGES : 7

SUBJECTS :
NOSENKO RE OSWALD

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/16/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : MEMO, INC MEMO, ASSESSMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

26 MAR 1964

5668 SCW/HSE
8-14-48 (TFK)
DECLASSIFIED BY: SP7/clh/mg
ON: 11/21/94
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John Edgar Hoover
Director, Federal Bureau
of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
SUBJECT: SAMMY

REFERENCE: CSCI-3/780,604 dtd 19 Mar 64
Bureau File No. (S) 65-68530

1. Transmitted herewith is a copy of a report on the SAMMY case prepared by the Chief, Soviet Russia Division for the information of the Deputy Director for Plans. It is an "in house" document containing an interim assessment of SAMMY's bona fides and may not be disseminated to other departments without permission of this Agency. The report is loaned to your Bureau per paragraph 5 of referent memorandum.

2. After reviewing the origins of the SAMMY case, the report discusses SAMMY's motivation, his production to date, his behavior, and certain other cases which appear to relate in some way to the SAMMY case. The report concludes that SAMMY is a KGB plant, discusses possible KGB aims in such an operation, and recommends action to resolve the case.

3. In previous correspondence, this Agency has noted the need for an early evaluation by your Bureau of the information reported by SAMMY on American citizens. This evaluation not only will affect the manner in which portions of this information pertaining to other agencies and departments would be disseminated but also will form an important part of the final determination of SAMMY's bona fides. Similarly, in making available to your Bureau a copy of the SR Division interim report on SAMMY's bona fides, we are interested in having as soon as possible your views on other aspects of the case described in the report, particularly those which refer to operational activities of your Bureau. ENCLOSURE

4. In considering how best your Bureau and this Agency can proceed in further examination of this case, it is probable that normal procedures for exchange of information will not suffice. SAMMY is a unique case for which no parallel exists insofar as we are aware and its proper resolution suggests the need for the closest

CLASSIFIED PER CIA
LETTER OF

MAR 5 1984

~~TOP SECRET~~

REC-65-68530-99
AUG 26 1963

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT JM 6-17-94
ONLY THESE 7 pgs were processed
to the HSCA REQUEST

ENCLOSURE

4cc's of letter
+ enclosure made
3/27/84
HSCA Schmitt, NYO 2
given SA Taylor
who 3/27/84
OAW

~~TOP SECRET~~

TAB "E"

PERSONAL DATA, CONDUCT AND MANNER

Statements about Himself

1. Biography: NOSENKO has contradicted himself in his own accounts of his life in ways which may be related to the events and personalities he is reporting on. Especially noteworthy is this shift of dates: in 1962, he said that he graduated from the Institute of Foreign Relations in 1950, went into the Naval GRU, and then entered the KGB at the beginning of 1953. In 1964, he said he had graduated in 1949 and entered the KGB in early 1952. This affects his version of getting into the KGB with KOBULOV's help as KOBULOV was not in the KGB from 1948 to March 1953.

2. Friendship with GUK and CHURANOV: NOSENKO claims to be an intimate friend of certain KGB officers, especially GUK and CHURANOV, from whom he has obtained by word of mouth most of the few operational items he has been able to provide outside his own immediate sphere of activity. He mentions these two individuals so often that that alone would deserve special attention. But on top of that these two individuals were two of GOLITSYN's closest contacts, from whom GOLITSYN also learned by word of mouth about many operations -- sensitive ones at that -- which he had no right to know. Yet, if NOSENKO were in fact this close to them, there can be little doubt that GOLITSYN would have known NOSENKO better. As it is, GOLITSYN remembers only that there was a NOSENKO working in the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate who had a reputation as a skirt-chaser. There are grounds here for suspicion that GUK and CHURANOV gave honest accounts of what they had told GOLITSYN in the KGB damage assessment of GOLITSYN's defection, and that NOSENKO is fabricating this alleged friendship to explain how he had access to the same information as GOLITSYN (some of which is outlined in Tab "D", Table #4), which he is using -- at no cost to the KGB -- as build-up for himself.

3. Personal Involvement in Key Accidents: NOSENKO, when he came out in 1964, had certain information which he particularly wanted to give us concerning practically all of the known or notorious incidents of Soviet security history in the period since his last meetings with us. It appears to stretch coincidence

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~GROUP I~~

~~Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

2.

(5) to the limit that this one KGB officer, NOSENKO, was personally involved in every one of them, and could thus talk -- and deliver the KGB's "message" -- with complete authority. Note his role in the cases of Lee Harvey OSWALD, of Professor BARGHOORN, of Bernard KOTEN, of the CHEREPANOV affair (even to the point of showing a travel order for his use in the "search" for CHEREPANOV) and others. Note also his fortuitous friendship with Georgiy BOLSHAKOV, which permitted him to recount in detail a provocative version of BOLSHAKOV's dealings with the White House.

4. Order of Lenin and/or Case Award: NOSENKO mentioned in January 1964 that he had received the Order of Lenin "shortly after the 1962 meetings with us," as a result of ideas he developed on how to enlarge the experience and improve the quality of staff personnel on the job. About a month later he mentioned to one of his security guards that he had received a large cash award (no date, but was then reluctant to say why; it is not clear whether this is separate from the medal mentioned earlier). Now, such medals and awards are not given for routine contributions. However, it is possible that NOSENKO could not resist bragging about his medal (or feared that we might hear of it through other sources), and that he actually got it for his 1962 meetings with us -- as the timing would suggest. In fact, on one occasion he pointedly asked whether his 1962 case officer had received an award from the 1962 meetings with him. And the cash award may have been related to a report from another source, that some officers of the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate had gotten cash awards for the recruitment of one or more Americans in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow around 1960 -- when NOSENKO was in that Department.

5. Claim to have Worked in Place for Us: NOSENKO has repeatedly said that he tried earnestly to collect every bit of information he could for us during the period between the 1962 meetings and his defection in 1964. He uses his written notes, many of them on small scraps of paper, to document this claim. Yet he clearly did not try to collect even the most insignificant item of positive intelligence, political or military, from his many contacts, nor did he even bring out a clear table of organization for the First Chief Directorate, which could be had for the asking by a person in his position. The nearly 200 operational leads he so earnestly collected do not, insofar as our traces to date permit us to judge, contain the identity of a single active agent with any current access to U.S. or NATO classified information.

6. Shift of Job Before Contact With Us: NOSENKO claimed to have transferred from the American Department to the Tourist

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP~~ SECRET

3.

Department in January 1962. According to knowledgeable sources, a provocation agent about to be put into contact with hostile intelligence would usually be removed from his job, particularly if it was a relatively sensitive one, at least six months before being sent out. This is the exact pattern in NOSENKO's biography: he left (at least ostensibly) the section working against the American Embassy just a month after GOLITSYN's defection (and about the time planning for a provocation would have begun) and moved to the Tourist Department, whose targets and methods are less sensitive, more transitory -- and more numerous -- and whose basic techniques had been well known to GOLITSYN, partly through a detailed document GOLITSYN was known to have taken with him from the Helsinki Residency. It is possible that NOSENKO did not in fact move from the First Department as early as he claims.

7. Sourcing of Information: NOSENKO has provided information (1), from his own immediate vantage point in the Tourist Department, and (2), which he has learned through other means. In the first category we learned interesting details on methods and organization, although their essence was already known from GOLITSYN; and a mass of names and identifying data on agents and agent candidates which he claims to be the totality of his Department's successes and which turn out to be practically worthless to us or the KGB. His own position, however, has enabled NOSENKO to play a role in some more notorious events: the OSWALD case, the KOTEN case, the BARGHOORN case, etc., which are of interest. But much of NOSENKO's more interesting information came from outside his immediate periphery. His accounts of how he got these other items provide an interesting aspect of the bona fides problem.

8. As will be touched on again in this paper, NOSENKO has information which he has volunteered, often out of context, and which he was clearly trying to get over to us, as contrasted to what we get from him through questioning. Aside from OSWALD, BARGHOORN and KOTEN, however, practically every one of these was outside his normal access, and was obtained fortuitously or through conversations with other case officers. This way of getting information is normal and expectable. What is unusual about NOSENKO's case is that his explanations are in every such case either vague, confused or unbelievable and he quickly becomes irritated and defensive when questioned in detail on sources. Almost every item that NOSENKO volunteered has an implausible source. A few examples are given in the paragraphs below.

~~TOP~~ SECRET